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This  empirical  study  takes  advantage  of  a  new  intergovernmental  grant  in  order  to  investigate  the 
expenditure behavior of the municipalities in Sweden in two ways. First, the grant is used to study the 
effect on municipal spending related to the grant. Second, the grant is used to test a hypothesis of spatial 
interaction among municipalities due to mimicking behavior. The grant and expenditures studied here 
pertain  to  one  specific  service  area  of  the  Swedish  municipalities;  services  to  functionally  impaired 
individuals. The grant was introduced in 2004. The data used pertains to the period before (2001-2003) 
and after (2004-2007) the introduction of the grant. A fixed-effects spatial lag model is used to study the 
(possible) spatial interactions among municipalities. Interestingly, the results show that during the first 
time period, the municipalities interact with their neighbors when setting the expenditure level, possibly 
due to mimicking. In the second time period, after the introduction of the grant, there is no evidence of 
interaction. This would support the hypothesis that the governmental grants provide information to the 
municipalities and the need for mimicking diminishes with the grant. 
 
Keywords: Local public expenditures, Intergovernmental grants, Spatial Interaction 
JEL classification: H72, H77, R12 
 
   
                                                 
 E-mail: lena.birkelof@econ.umu.se Phone: +46 (0)90786 6547. Fax +46 (0)90 772302. 
I am grateful to Niklas Hanes, Johan Lundberg, Sergio Rey, Magnus Wikström and participants at the NARSC 
meeting, Brooklyn 2008, and the WRSA meeting, Napa Valley 2009 for valuable comments and suggestions. Thanks 
also  to  Heléne  Lundqvist  and  the  other  participants  at  the  Public  Economics  workshop  in  Uppsala,  2008,  for 
valuable comments and suggestions  on an earlier version of this  paper. I am also grateful to David Folch for 
programming  assistance.  A  research  grant  from  the  Swedish  Council  for  Working  Life  and  Social  Research  is 
gratefully acknowledged. 1 
 
1. Introduction  
The aim of this paper is to study the effect of a new intergovernmental grant distributed to 
Swedish  municipalities.  Two  channels  through  which  grants  can  affect  public  spending  are 
hypothesized. First, similar to previous studies on intergovernmental grants, the effect of the 
grant  on  related  public  expenditure  is  studied.  Second,  and  unlike  other  studies  on 
intergovernmental  grants,  this  study  will  also  focus  on  the  information  and  design  of  this 
particular grant and study if it makes municipalities change their level of interaction among each 
other.  
 
Studies on intergovernmental grants usually address the effects on local public expenditures of 
the grant. While economic theory predicts that an increase in unconditional grants to a local 
jurisdiction should have the same effect as an equivalent increase in income (Bradford and Oates, 
1971 a,b), empirical work on intergovernmental grants usually find that public spending from 
grants exceeds that from equivalent increases in income. This empirical phenomenon is labeled 
the flypaper effect since “money sticks where it hits”.
1 There are several studies on federal grants 
and  local  public  expenditures  in  the  literature.  In  a  study  on  American  data,  Knight  (2002) 
incorporates the political determination of federal grants and the effects of these grants on state 
policies, and finds that federal highway grants decrease state highway spending. Swedish studies 
include Dahlberg, Mörk, Rattsö, Ågren (2007) who study the effect of federal grants on the 
behavior of lower level governments. They find evidence of federal grants being used to increase 
local spending, but not to reduce the local tax rate. On the other hand, Wikström (2007) finds 
that an intergovernmental grant toward public childcare did not affect the per-child expenditure, 
but it did affect the municipal tax rate. For surveys of the literature on intergovernmental grants, 
see e.g. Hines and Thaler (1995), and Oates (1999). 
 
There are reasons to believe that local governments, such as municipalities, are interdependent 
when making expenditure decisions, deciding on the tax policy, or setting welfare levels. The 
interaction  arising  from  the  interdependence  among  the  municipalities  could  be  due  to,  for 
example, mimicking, competition, or spillover among the municipalities. This interaction could 
also have a spatial dimension. For one thing, the decisions made by a local government can also 
                                                 
1  Arthur Okun’s  observation  “money  sticks  where  it hits”  was  named  “flypaper  effect”  by  Courant, 
Gramlich and Rubinfeld’s (1979).  2 
 
have consequences for surrounding jurisdictions, not only the own jurisdiction.
2 However, the 
spatial interaction must not necessarily be specific in a geographical context; other forms of 
closeness are also possible.
3 One of the first papers of spatial interaction is the study by Case, 
Hines and Rosen (1993), where they use a spillover model to study the budget spillover among 
U.S. states. Their results indicate that a state’s government level of per capita expenditure is 
positively and significantly affected by the expenditure levels of its neighbors. Since the study by 
Case et al., there have been an increasing number of studies that include spatial interaction. For 
example,  Dahlberg  and  Edmark  (2008)  find  that  there  exists  a  “race-to-the-bottom”  among 
neighboring municipalities regarding the welfare level; a municipality’s welfare level is positively 
and significantly affected by the welfare level in neighboring municipalities. For other studies on 
welfare and tax competition, see e.g. Revelli (2005) and Allers and Elhorst (2005). In a study on 
local  public  expenditure  in  the  Czech  Republic,  Stastna  (2009)  finds  a  positive  spatial 
autocorrelation  for  expenditure  on  housing  and  culture,  possibly  due  to  mimicking;  while 
negative  spatial  autocorrelation  is  found  for  the  expenditure  on  industry,  infrastructure  and 
environmental protection, which is consistent with the spillover hypothesis. For other studies on 
spatial spillover, see e.g. Murdoch, Rahmatian and Thayer (1993), Hanes (2002), and Lundberg 
(2006). 
 
National governments sometimes impose new duties and responsibilities on local governments. 
One way of financing these new duties is by intergovernmental grants to the local governments. 
In  this  paper,  one  such  intergovernmental  grant  is  studied.  This  grant  is  associated  with 
expenditures for one specific service area of the Swedish municipalities; services to functionally 
impaired individuals. The responsibility for these services, called LSS-services, was transferred to 
the  municipalities in  1994  via a government reform (LSS-act  1993:387).
4,5 The LSS-act  is an 
entitlement law that gives individuals with functional impairments the right to obtain support and 
services  to  obtain  equal  opportunities  in  living  conditions  and  full  participation  in  the 
community.  Ever  since  the  introduction  of  the  LSS-act,  there  has  been  an  increase  in  the 
expenditure for the services. The intergovernmental grant studied in this paper was introduced in 
2004 as a response to the increased expenditure for the LSS services. In this paper, it is studied 
                                                 
2 See e.g. Wilson (1999) for a review of the literature on tax competition and Brueckner (2003) for a 
description of the theoretical frameworks for strategic interaction among local governments. 
3 For example, spatial interaction could be modeled as political or economical closeness.  
4 The LSS-act stands for “The Act Concerning Support and Service for Persons with Certain Functional 
Impairments” (in Swedish: Lag om stöd och service till vissa funktionshindrade). 
5 See Birkelöf (2008) and for a more detailed description of the services to functional impaired. 3 
 
how the grant affects the local governments’ decisions with regard to LSS services. Is the grant 
used to increase spending on LSS services? If so, is the increase greater than a similar sized 
increase  from  other  income,  contrary  to  theory?  In  addition,  is  the  intergovernmental  grant 
associated with information to the municipalities? Here, it is hypothesized that the interaction 
among municipalities arises from mimicking and/or cooperation among the municipalities. The 
grant is based  upon a nationally determined standardized cost, and since this information  is 
transparent in the grant, these standardized costs could be used by the municipalities that seek 
information (at the expenditure/service level), rather than mimicking each other. In order to 
study the effect of this grant, two separate time periods are used. The first time period, 2001-
2003, corresponds to the time before the introduction of the grant, and the second time period, 
2004-2007, corresponds to the time period after the introduction of the grant. To support the 
hypothesis that, via the information on standardized costs, the intergovernmental grant decreases 
the  need  for  information  mimicking,  the  level  of  interaction  among  municipalities  should 
decrease in the second time period.
6  
 
The contribution of this paper is twofold. First, it adds to the public expenditure literature by 
analyzing the behavior of municipalities with regard to a new intergovernmental grant. The grant 
is directed toward an area that has experienced high increase s in expenditure due to an earlier 
governmental reform of this particular service area. Second, it adds to the spatial interaction 
literature by showing that spatial interaction could be due to lack of information and the 
municipalities thus mimicking in order to avoid information costs. Although this study pertains 
to expenditures in Sweden, it may still be of interest to other countries, especially since the social 
support system continues to develop throughout the world. With the increasing social suppor t 
sector, as well as the growing elderly population, many countries are currently experiencing an 
increasing expenditure burden.  
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes institutional characteristics of 
the LSS-act and section 3 discusses theory and the empirical model. Section 4 describes the data 
and section 5 presents the empirical findings, while concluding remarks can be found in section 
6. 
 
                                                 
6 It cannot be ruled out that earlier cooperation among municipalities also affects the level of interaction. 
However, as will be described later in this paper, the cooperation agreements were only applicable for two 
of the nine LSS services studied here.  4 
 
2. Institutional Characteristics  
The Act Concerning Support and Service for Persons with Certain Functional Impairments (LSS) 
is an entitlement law to guarantee individuals with major and long-term  functional  disability 
equality in living conditions and full participation in the community.
7 The responsibility for the 
LSS service provision largely resides with the municipalities that are responsible for nine of the 
ten LSS services; while the county council is responsible for the remaining service. 8 There has 
been a significant increase in the expenditures for LSS services over the years a nd there are also 
large differences among municipalities. 9 To a great extent, this variation in expenditures can be 
explained by the nature of the LSS service production. While LSS naturally depends on the 
specific needs of the individuals and the number o f services required, it also depends on the 
concentration of individuals with a need for LSS services in the municipalities. 
 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics, LSS characteristic             
   2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007 
Increase 
2001-2007 
Individuals with LSS 
services* 
47330  48863  51662  52994  54360  54824  56880  20.2% 
Number of LSS 
Services granted* 
82464  85462  90352  93083  95254  97712  99457  20.6% 
Average expenditure 
per individual receiving 
LSS service, SEK** 
424300  414646  420680  424737  428720  447371  447388  5.5% 
*LSS services here only refer to the nine services performed by the municipalities. 
**Prices adjusted to 2001 year prices.  
 
                                                 
7 The LSS-act contains provisions relating to measures for special support and special services for those with 
an intellectual disability, autism or a condition resembling autism; or for those with a significant and permanent 
intellectual impairment that occurred after brain damage in adulthood, or for those with other major and 
permanent physical or mental impairments not due to normal aging. 
8 The ten services are: relief service in the home; children in residential homes; adults in residential homes; 
daily activity; personal contact; after school supervision; short stay away from home; companion service; 
personal assistance, and counseling and other personal support (which is the responsibility of the county 
councils).  
9 The expenditure studied in this paper only pertains to the nine services performed by the municipalities 
since they are the only ones included in the LSS expenditure equalization system. One of the LSS services, 
Personal Assistance, is the responsibility of the municipalities for the first twenty hours (per week). If a 
person’s needs call for more than twenty hours per week, this is a federal government (Social Service 
Administration) responsibility (as regulated in the LASS, Assistance Benefit Act).  5 
 
The expenditures on LSS services constitute a substantial
10 part of the spending on services in the 
municipalities; however, the resources are limited and many of the municipalities have not 
fulfilled their obligations according to the LSS -act (The National Board of Health and Welfare, 
NBHW, 2005). Table 1 shows the total number of individuals with LSS services in Sweden, as 
well as the total number of LSS services provided (each individual can get more than one LSS 
service). As shown by Table 1, there has been a steady increase in both the number of individuals 
and the expenditure per person during the period 2001-2007. For example, during 2001-2007, the 
number  of  individuals  receiving  LSS  has  increased  by  more  than  20  percent.  For  a  more 
thorough review of the LSS-act and its development, see Birkelöf (2008) and Lewin, Westin and 
Lewin (2008). 
 
LSS Expenditure Equalization Grant 
The financing of municipalities’ LSS services has been subject to controversy ever since the LSS-
act was implemented. For example, the Swedish Association of Local Authorities and Regions 
(SALAR)
11 believes that a federal financing of LSS services would be the best way of creating 
equal conditions for the municipalities as well as helping the municipalities operate a well 
functioning service. In 2000, the government appointed a group to inve stigate how to best 
equalize the expenditure for the LSS services among municipalities (SOU 2002:103). While the 
investigations took place, the government distributed a 350 million SEK grant to municipalities 
with extraordinarily high costs for their LSS services. Certain criteria had to be met to receive the 
grant; however, the grant itself was unconditional, meaning that there were no restrictions on 
how to spend it. The eligible municipalities, each year approximately 50 out of 290, received the 
grant for the years 2001-2003.12. Then, in November 2003, the government decided to implement 
the new expenditure equalization system for LSS expenditure starting in 2004.
13 The purpose of 
the new grant was to equalize the cost for LSS services among municipalities  via an intra-
municipality system. 
                                                 
10  For  example,  the  expenditures  for  LSS  are  24-28  percent  of  the  total  expenditures for  the  whole 
“Elderly and Disabled” sector (calculated by using expenditures available at www.WebOr.se; provided by 
the Swedish Association of Local Authorities and Regions). 
11 In Swedish: Sveriges Kommuner och Landsting (SKL).  
12 Each year, the municipalities had to meet the criteria (i.e. the expenditure had to be at a certain level). 
Most of the municipalities that received the grant one year also received it for the two other years, 
although there were some municipalities that received it only once or twice.  
13 The decisions were based on the Legislative Proposal 2002/03:151 “Equalization of certain costs for 
special support to individuals with functional impairments” (In Swedish: Utjämning av vissa kostnader för stöd 
och  service  till  funktionshindrade),  and from  a  federal  report  "Equalization  of  costs for LSS” (In  Swedish: 
Utjämning av LSS-kostnader), SOU 2002:103. 6 
 
 
The LSS expenditure equalization grant (LSS-EQ grant) is separate from the ordinary General grant 
system for income and cost equalization (where, for example, the structural cost difference for 
the mandatory services of municipality and county councils is accounted for). However, similar to 
the general grant and the temporary LSS grant (2001-2003), the LSS-EQ is also an unconditional 
grant. To determine the size of a municipality’s grant (or fee), the standardized cost for the 
municipality’s LSS service is calculated and compared to the calculated standardized cost of the 
whole  country.  The  calculation  of  the  standardized  costs  is  transparent  and  to  some  extent 
publicly available (at Statistic Sweden’s website, www.scb.se). The standardized cost is calculated 
by multiplying the number of LSS services by a national average cost for each service. The cost is 
also adjusted by a concentration index and a personnel cost index. The purpose of the concentration 
index is to reduce/compensate for economies of scale. The purpose of the personnel cost index is to 
adjust for differences in the requirement of support (some LSS services require more personnel 
than  others).  Then,  finally,  the  standardized  cost  is  adjusted  by  Net  Price  Index.  Unlike  the 
temporary grant of 2001-2003, the size of the LSS-EQ grant is known to the municipalities in 
advance. For a more thorough review of how the LSS-EQ grant is calculated, see Appendix A.  
 
Table 2. Standardized Cost* for municipalities and the nation    
  Calculated Standardized Cost for Municipalities  Nation 
Year  Mean  Std.Dev  Min  Max  Mean 
2004  2334 (2544)  684 (817)  564 (357)  4841 (5775)  2293 
2005  2582 (2659)  806 (839)  487 (501)  5858 (6262)  2546 
2006  2713 (2841)  769 (877)  814 (607)  5137 (6132)  2681 
*The values are shown in SEK per capita, adjusted to 2001 year prices.  
Note: the values within parenthesis are the actual expenditures for LSS as reported 
by the municipalities. 
 
The standardized cost, per capita, is computed for every municipality and for the whole nation. If 
a municipality’s calculated standardized cost is higher than the national standardized cost, the 
municipality receives a grant. On the other hand, if a municipality’s standardized cost is lower 
than the national standardized cost, the municipality must pay a fee.
14 The grant (or fee) that a 
municipality  is  to  receive  (pay)  is  multiplied  by  the  pop ulation  of  the  municipality.  For 
comparison, Table 2 shows the calculated standardized cost for the municipalities and the 
                                                 
14 The equalization system is regulated in two laws; the law of equalization-fees (SFS 2003:886) and the law 
of equalization-grants (SFS 2003:887). 7 
 
country’s  standardized  cost.  The  municipalities’  actual  expenditures  for  the  LSS  services  are 
shown  within  parentheses.  Between  2004  and  2008,  certain  transition  rules  consisting  of  a 
maximum fee and a maximum grant apply. During the transition period, the difference between the 
total  grant and the  total fee (from all  municipalities) is financed by the  federal  government. 
Therefore, the equalization system will not be fully implemented until the year 2009.  
 
Cooperation/agreements among municipalities  
The municipalities are responsible for providing LSS services to their citizens. However, if a 
municipality is not able to provide the service itself, then (as regulated by §17 in the LSS-act) 
cooperation among municipalities is possible for two of the LSS services: children in residential 
homes and adults in residential homes. Municipalities can enter into agreements with one another 
where one municipality retains the cost responsibility for its residents living in special residential 
homes  in  another  municipality,  while  the  other municipality  provides  the  services.  The  §17-
agreements  are  used  by,  for  example,  small  municipalities  which  do  not  have  the  ability  to 
provide the  service  themselves.  Municipalities entering into §17  agreements get a lower LSS 
expenditure  per  capita  than  they  otherwise  would  (Birkelöf,  2008).  However,  due  to  the 
introduction  of  the  LSS  expenditure  equalization  grant  in  2004,  many  municipalities  have 
canceled the §17-agreements. The individuals living in the residential homes are now registered 
citizens of the municipalities where the residential homes are located, and their costs are instead 
included in the expenditure equalization system. 
 
3. Theoretical Framework and Empirical Strategy 
This section will start with a brief discussion on the theory of intergovernmental grants and the 
theoretical backgrounds of the different fiscal interaction models. This is followed by a discussion 
of how the LSS expenditure equalization grant and the (possible) fiscal interaction with regard to 
services for functionally impaired are linked. 
 
3.1 Theoretical Background 
Theory of Intergovernmental grants 
In the  theory  of intergovernmental  grants and the  basic median voter model,  the  source of 
income is of no importance for the local government. Therefore, grants and local income have 
similar effects on local spending as long as the grants are given lump-sum (Bradford and Oates, 
1971 a,b). Grants to the local government should be treated as any other income, i.e. they should 
be  allocated  according  to  the  income  elasticities  of  the  median  voter.  However,  contrary  to 8 
 
theory,  the  empirical  literature  on  public  expenditures  usually  finds  that  public  spending  is 
increased more by (lump-sum) grants than by local income. This is the so-called flypaper effect, 
since “money sticks where it hits”. For surveys of the literature on intergovernmental grants, see 
e.g. Hines and Thaler (1995) and Oates (1999). 
 
There are two groups of intergovernmental grants: unconditional grants and conditional grants. 
Unconditional grants are free to be spent in any way, and the way in which they are usually 
designed implies that income from unconditional grants should have the same impact on local 
spending as the same size increase in local residents’ income. Conditional grants, on the other 
hand, are grants given for specific purposes; for example, the national government can use these 
to compensate the local government for carrying out a specific program. Their use is normally 
restricted; the money cannot be spent on other expenditure programs or be used to cut taxes. In 
addition to the two groups of grants, there is also a second dimension to the grants; they can 
either be matching or non-matching grants. Non-matching grants are often used to increase 
equality among jurisdictions, in terms of income/spending. Matching grants are designed as price 
subsidies; these grants have an income effect as well as a substitution effect. The grant decreases 
the relative price of the service/expenditure. Therefore, matching grants should have a flypaper 
effect since they affect the slope of the budget line, while non-matching grants only have an 
income effect and should not have a flypaper effect. However, studies of non-matching grants 
usually find a flypaper effect; contrary to theory. For an extensive review of intergovernmental 
transfers; see Intergovernmental Fiscal Transfers: Principles and Practice Boadway and Shah (eds.) (2007). 
Both the temporary LSS grant and the permanent LSS expenditure equalization grant studied in 
this paper are unconditional non-matching grants. Although designed for a specific purpose, 
there is no restriction on how municipalities spend them. Since there are no restrictions, the 
effect of the grants can be in the form of higher quality on the services for LSS (due to increased 
spending on LSS services); lower tax rates in the municipalities; or increased spending on other 
municipality services. Naturally, a mixture of these three outcomes is also possible.  
 
Theory of Fiscal Interaction 
There  are  several  reasons  to  believe  that  local  jurisdictions,  such  as  municipalities,  are 
interdependent when making tax policy, welfare level or expenditure decisions. One reason why 
municipalities are interdependent is that the benefits of public spending in one jurisdiction can 
spill over to neighboring jurisdictions. The interdependence among local governments could then 
cause  a  strategic  interaction  among  jurisdictions.  For  example,  infrastructure,  environmental 9 
 
protection, and parks in one jurisdiction can increase the welfare of residents in a neighboring 
jurisdiction. The neighboring jurisdiction can then “free-ride” and decrease its own spending on 
these services. In this sense, public expenditure from one jurisdiction enters the welfare function 
of other jurisdictions, directly affecting the jurisdiction. Local jurisdictions can also be indirectly affected 
by the fiscal policies of other jurisdictions (Brueckner, 2003). In order to attract a mobile tax 
base, a local jurisdiction can compete with lower tax rates as compared to nearby jurisdictions. 
This is due to the idea that individuals “vote with their feet” and move to a community that 
provides the desired level of a public good/tax rate.
15 Interaction of this type can also be applied 
to welfare benefits. However, here the jurisdictions compete with low levels of welfare benefits in 
order not to attract welfare recipients (Brueckner 2000). This is the so-called race-to-the-bottom 
behavior.  
The  interdependence  among  local  governments  could  also  arise  from  yardstick  competition 
(performance  comparison).  The  interaction  comes  from  the  existence  of  an  informational 
externality  among  neighboring  jurisdictions  due  to  imperfect  information,  and  the  cost  of 
obtaining  information  (Besley  and  Case,  1995).  Imperfectly  informed  voters  can  use  the 
performance  of  other  jurisdictions  as  a  yardstick  when  evaluating  their  own  politicians’ 
performance. In their study, Besley and Case conclude that politicians in office need to look at 
other local politicians and their decision making before making their own decisions (to avoid the 
risk  of  not  being  reelected).  The  yardstick  model  can  also  be  applied  to  local  governments 
themselves, i.e. local governments can also be incompletely informed. The yardstick model is 
commonly  used  for  comparison  of  performance  among  local  governments,  so-called 
benchmarking. A local government can – when deciding on the best policy or expenditure level – 
use nearby jurisdictions as a yardstick/benchmark and mimic their policy or expenditure level in 
order  to  avoid  an  information  cost  associated  with  obtaining  the  information  themselves. 
Yardstick competition could be used to study local governments’ decision making, for example, 
what service level to provide. For a survey of the empirical literature on strategic and fiscal 
interaction, see Brueckner (2003) and Revelli (2005). 
 
LSS-EQ Grant and Fiscal Interaction  
The hypothesis in this paper is that municipalities interact with one another when setting their 
LSS  expenditure  level.  Since  LSS  services  constitute  a  type  of  social  service  provisions,  the 
                                                 
15 This is the so-called “Tibeout migration” where migration to other regions is motivated by fiscal gains. 
This argument was originally presented by Tiebout (1956). 10 
 
expected source of fiscal interaction might be consistent with the theory of fiscal competition, in 
particular race-to-the-bottom. However, in this paper, it is argued that the source of interaction 
among nearby municipalities is due to lack of information on the municipalities’ side. Therefore, 
the source of fiscal interaction in municipalities comes from the yardstick model, in particular 
mimicking.  As  previously  mentioned,  the  LSS-act  is  an  entitlement  law,  which  gives  eligible 
individuals the right to obtain services in accordance with the act. Since it is an entitlement law, 
the usual goals of the local government are not applicable in the same way here (quantitative goal, 
for example). There are at least three reasons why the yardstick model is the most likely source of 
interaction in the present case. First, the LSS service provision became the responsibility of the 
municipalities via a reform in 1994 and the entire new LSS-act was implemented at the same 
time. The LSS-act extended the number of people eligible to receive services, as well as the 
number  of  services  offered  (as  compared  to  when  the  county  council  was  responsible  for 
providing the service). Only general guidelines for the provision of LSS services were provided 
for the municipalities and therefore, the uncertainty was great. Thus, in order to get information, 
while minimizing the information costs, the municipalities may mimic each other in their effort 
to  provide  the  service.  Second,  only  about  0.5  percent  of  the  population  receives  services 
according  to  the  LSS-act  and,  as  a  group,  they  are  not  very  mobile.  Furthermore,  many  of 
individuals who receive LSS services are dependent on having friends and family nearby, thus 
making them even less mobile. Third, one of the reasons for the LSS reform (the transfer of 
responsibility from the county level to the municipality level) was the aim of not having any 
differences in the provision due to geographical location. Since there are still differences among 
municipalities, this may point to a lack of information on what the service level should be rather 
than believing that some municipalities deliberately set their own LSS service/expenditure level 
below that of others.  
 
With  regard  to  the  theory  of  intergovernmental  grants,  the  LSS-EQ  grant  is  known  to  the 
municipalities in advance and, as mentioned, the grant is an unconditional non-matching grant. 
The  municipalities  will  therefore  take  the  LSS-EQ  grant  into  account  when  allocating  their 
budget for the coming year. If municipalities increased their spending on LSS services by more 
than  a  similar  increase  in  income,  it  would  be  consistent  with  the  flypaper  effect;  i.e. 
intergovernmental grants increase local expenditures. The temporary grant, on the contrary, was 
associated with great insecurity, and it is likely that the municipalities would not expect or include 
it  when  budgeting  their  LSS  service  provision  for  the  coming  year.  If  that  is  true,  then 
municipalities receiving the (unconditional) temporary grant would view this as any other income, 11 
 
i.e. they would not increase (or decrease) their spending on LSS services as a result of an increase 
in the grant. 
 
3.2 Empirical Model 
Spatial interaction among governments arises when the spending decision in one jurisdiction does 
not  only  depend  on  its  own  characteristics  but  also  on  the  level  of  spending  by  other 
jurisdictions.  The  dependence  could  either  be  directly,  such  as  in  the  spillover  model,  or 
indirectly, as in the tax- or yardstick competition models. Spatial interaction can be modeled 
either in the spatial lag model or the spatial error model. In the spatial lag model, the interaction is 
specified by including a spatially lagged dependent variable; in the spatial error model, the spatial 
dependence is in the error term.
16 When spatial dependence is due to strategic interaction, it is 
theoretically consistent with including a spatially lagged dependent variable in the model. Since 
the hypothesis in this paper is that the  municipalities mimic/interact with nearby municipalities, 
spatial interaction will be modeled according to the lag model.
17 In general, the spatial lag model 
can be specified as (in matrix form) 
 
X WY Y         (1) 
 
where  Y  is  a  vector  of  spending,  W  is  a  weight  matrix  that  describes  the  neighborhood 
relationship, X is a matrix of explanatory variables for the jurisdictions, ε is a vector of errors; 
and δ and vector β are parameters to be estimated, where δ is the spatial interaction parameter. 
One major issue in the estimation of the spatial lag model is the endogeneity of Y. Since Y 
appears  on  both  sides  of  the  equation,  multidirectional  dependence  between  the  dependent 
variables exists, and errors for one observation are likely to be related to the errors in neighboring 
observations,  i.e.  spatial  dependence  (Anselin,  1988).  The  resulting  correlation  means  that 
ordinary  least  squares  (OLS)  estimates  of  the  parameters  of  the  equation  are  biased  and 
inconsistent. This requires the use of alternative methods for estimating the model; either by 
using instrument variables (IV) or using maximum likelihood (ML) estimator. 
 
                                                 
16 In the spatial error model, the dependence could be due to omitted variables or shocks that are spatially 
dependent themselves.  
17 However, in the results section, a Lagrange Multiplier test is presented to discriminate between the two 
models. The LM tests points toward the spatial lag model being the correct way of specifying the spatial 
dependence in this case.  12 
 
In this paper, panel data is used in order to study the effects of the LSS intergovernmental grants 
during different time periods. Panel data will generally be more informative, with more variation 
and less collinearity among variables (Elhorst, 2003). Panel data also allows for the specification 
of more complicated behavioral hypotheses including effects that cannot be addressed using pure 
cross-sectional or time-series data (Hsiao 1986, Baltagi 2001). The traditional fixed effects model 
has been extended to include a spatial lag dependence specification
18 (Anselin and Hudak, 1992). 
Following Elhorst (2003), the spatial lag model extended to include fixed effects for space and 
time can be specified as:  
 
    , it it i it it it X WY Y         (2) 
 
where i = 1,.., N is for spatial units (municipalities), and t = 1,…, T is for time dimension.  is 
the spatial interaction parameter to be estimated;  i  and  it are the variable intercept treated as 
fixed, representing the effect of the omitted variables that are unique for each municipality and 
year. The weight matrix, W, describes the relationship between the neighboring units, ωij 19. To 
estimate the model, the weight matrix W must be defined in advance. In the literature, it is 
common to define neighbors based on geographical contiguity or distance.
20 The hypothesis in 
this paper, with regard to spatial interaction, is that nearby municipalities mimic and interac ts 
with one another in order to obtain information (on the expenditure level for LSS). To not only 
include the closest neighbor, the neighborhood weight matrix is based on a second -order binary 
contiguity matrix for Swedish municipalities.
21 Both a municipality’s neighbor and its neighbor’s 
neighbor are considered to be neighbors in the second-order contiguity matrix. If the spatial 
interaction parameter is significantly different from zero, the hypothesis of no spatial interaction 
can  be  rejected  and  it  can  be  interpreted  as  an  indication  of  the  neighboring  municipalities 
interacting with each other.  
 
                                                 
18 The traditional fixed effects model has also been extended to include a spatial error specification; see 
Anselin and Hudak (1992). 
19 ωij takes the value of one if municipalities i and j are neighbors, and zero otherwise. The diagonal in W 
(the municipality’s own spending: ωii) is always zero. Furthermore, the weight-matrix is row standardized, 
so that each row sums to one. 
20 Other definitions are also possible, such as political or economic closeness. 
21 Other definitions of neighbors are also possible. For example, “neighbors” could be based on the size 
of the municipalities or defined as commuting regions. In Birkelöf (2008), a set of different neighborhood 
matrixes was tested with regard to expenditures for LSS services, and the interaction among municipalities 
seems to be in geographically close municipalities.  13 
 
To get consistent estimates for the   coefficients, the use of demeaned spatial regression may be 
appropriate  (Anselin,  Le  Gallo,  and  Jayet  2008,  Elhorst  2003).
22  The demeaned equation is 
obtained by subtracting the average for each cross -sectional unit computed over the time 
dimension – which eliminates the individual fixed effects as well as the constant term (Anselin et 
al. 2008).




To study the hypothesis of interaction due to information spillover, the data in this study is 
divided into two data sets in order to study the  effect of the  LSS expenditure equalization grant, 
implemented in 2004. The hypothesis is that the spatial interaction parameter in the two time 
periods differs from one another due to the LSS-EQ grant. Both the temporary LSS grant and the 
permanent LSS expenditure equalization grant are included in this study; the temporary grant is 
included in the first time period, while the permanent grant is included in the second time period. 
The temporary grant is not expected to have any effect on the dependent variable LSS expenditure 
or affect the level of mimicking. That is, municipalities are still expected to mimic each other 
since this grant did not provide any information; i.e. the spatial interaction coefficient is expected 
to be positive. The LSS-EQ grant, on the other hand, is expected to affect both the dependent 
variable and the lag parameter. If the LSS-EQ grant provides the municipalities with information 
about the expenditure level, as is the hypothesis, the need to mimic its neighbors should decrease 
or  diminish;  therefore,  the  coefficient  should  not  differ  from  zero.  In  the  second  period, 
municipalities are expected to use part of the grant to increase their expenditures for LSS services 





                                                 
22 In Elhorst models, the log-likelihood uses σ2I as the error variance, not σ2QNT (in Anselin et al. 2008, p 
641).  
23 The dependent and explanatory variables for every spatial unit (municipality) are taken in deviations of 
their average over time. For example, the dependent variable is defined as (Elhorst, 2003):  
T
t





  where    
24All computations are performed using the standard Matlab software packages (v.7.0) plus the freely 
available  spatial  panel  routine  toolbox  downloaded  from  James  P.  LeSage’s  website  at  www.spatial-
econometrics.com. Furthermore, the code for fixed effect spatial panel models is downloadable from the 
J.P Elhorst website at www.rug.nl/staff/j.p.elhorst/projects  14 
 
4. Data 
This study uses a seven year panel data set for Swedish municipalities, divided into two datasets; 
2001-2003 and 2004-2007. There are 290 municipalities and 21 county councils in Sweden. All 
municipalities except one, Gotland, are included in the analysis. Gotland is excluded because the 
municipality and the county council coincide and therefore have a different role than the other 
municipalities. All the data in this study is collected from Statistics Sweden (SCB), except the LSS 
service variables that are collected from the National Board of Health and Welfare (NBHW). 
Descriptive statistics – including mean, minimum and maximum values – for all variables are 
presented in Table 3 and Table 4, for the years 2001-2003 and 2004-2007, respectively. 
 
 Table 3. Descriptive statistics 2001-2003 
Variable  Mean  Std.Dev.  Min  Max 
LSS expenditure, per capita, SEK   2380  809  432  6080 
LSS temporary grant, per capita, SEK  53  156  0  1380 
Tax base, per capita, SEK  113094  15782  87300  240300 
General Grant, per capita, SEK  8060  4773  -15052  22699 
Population (log)  4.26  0.39  3.41  5.88 
Share of population age 75+, percent  9.74  2.25  3.21  15.45 
Share of population age 7-16, percent  13.95  1.24  7.99  17.61 
LSS service variable*:         
   - Daily activity  44.11  11.87  0  88.00 
   - Personal Assistance  10.60  10.10  0  80.00 
   - Companion Service  17.16  12.24  0  61.33 
   - Personal Contact  30.37  13.23  0  73.68 
   - Short stay away from home  20.74  8.76  0  54.55 
   - After school supervision  6.93  5.28  0  35.00 
   - Adults in residential home  34.90  12.15  0  72.37 
Individuals  with  LSS  services  per 
10000 inhabitants (0-64) 
57.69  17.40  10.14  150.31 
*the share of the individuals in a municipality with (a specific) LSS service of all 




The dependent variable in this study is LSS expenditure per capita (measured in SEK). All monetary 
variables in this study are adjusted to 2001 SEK using the Consumer Price Index (CPI) from 
Statistics Sweden. The dependent variable is chosen to study the effect of the grants on the LSS 
expenditure, but it is also chosen to reflect changes in quality of the LSS service (for example, 
increased expenditure may be a sign of higher spending on personnel).  
   15 
 
 Table 4. Descriptive statistics 2004-2007 
 Variable  Mean  Std.Dev.  Min  Max 
LSS expenditure, per capita, SEK   2720  854  363  6769 
LSS-EQ grant, per capita, SEK  71  675  -1150  3407 
Tax base, per capita, SEK  128004  15652  101200  245400 
General Grant, per capita, SEK  7112  4657  -14367  22267 
Population (log)  4.26  0.40  3.41  5.90 
Share of population age 75+, percent  9.84  2.23  3.43  16.17 
Share of population age 7-16, percent  12.90  1.27  7.11  17.23 
LSS service variable*:         
   - Daily activity  45.27  11.12  0  85.19 
   - Personal Assistance  7.96  7.22  0  51.94 
   - Companion Service  17.81  11.94  0  67.54 
   - Personal Contact  32.48  13.13  0  78.95 
   - Short stay away from home  19.50  8.25  0  54.55 
   - After school supervision  8.35  5.11  0  33.33 
   - Adults in residential home  34.96  11.45  0  64.47 
Individuals with LSS services per 10000 
inhabitants (0-64) 
62.89  17.05  15.41  160.46 
*the share of the individuals in a municipality with (a specific) LSS service of all 
individuals receiving any LSS service in that municipality.  
 
Explanatory variables  
In addition to the explanatory variables for the two LSS grants, explanatory variables for the 
different LSS services are also included in the analysis. The LSS expenditure per capita consists of 
the expenditures from all nine LSS services. However, the nine services are not equally cost 
intensive. To control for this, there are two alternative ways of measuring the impact of the 
different services on the expenditures. One way is to construct an index of how cost intensive 
each service is. Another way is to use the number of individuals that is granted each service in the 
analysis. Since the expenditures for the services are not reported individually, it is not possible to 
construct an index. Instead, to account for the differences in cost-intensity, the second option is 
used.
25 Specifically, the LSS services variables are reported as  “the number of individuals in a 
municipality with LSS service (daily activity for example), as a share of all individuals receiving 
any LSS service in that municipality”. For example, from Table 3, 44 percent of those who 
receive any LSS service receive the service Daily activity. This makes it the most common service. 
The service Adults in residential homes is the most expensive service and about 35 percent receive 
this. In a comparison between the two time periods, we can see that the percentage distribution 
                                                 
25 Seven of the LSS services provided by the municipalities are included as explanatory variables in this 
study. The two services that are excluded, children living in residential homes and relief service in the 
home are only granted to a few individuals and thus, there is no variation in the data over the years. 16 
 
of the  share of individuals with each service is similar. However, the number of individuals 
receiving  LSS  services  has  increased  from  57  to  63  (per  10000  inhabitants).  Moreover,  the 
average LSS expenditure per capita has increased over the two time periods, from 2380 to 2720 
SEK. 
 
Along with the two LSS grant variables, General grant is also included in the analysis. As mentioned 
in the theoretical discussion in section 3.1, in the basic median voter model of public finance, 
grant revenue is treated as any other income. However, contrary to theory, the empirical literature 
often finds that local public expenditures increase more with grants from the central government 
than with an equivalent increase in private income. To verify if the flypaper effect is evident here, 
the effect on LSS expenditure of an increase in LSS-EQ grant and the effect on LSS expenditure 
of an increase in General grants should be greater than the effect on LSS expenditure of revenue 
steaming from an increase in the Tax base. 
 
Additional explanatory variables are used to control for municipal characteristics that may affect 
the composition of expenditures in different municipalities. The age structure is measured by the 
share of the population aged 75 or older and the share of the population between the ages 7-16. These two 
variables are used in order to account for municipalities with a high share of elderly people or 
individuals of school age. Since the LSS-EQ grant is unconditional, if a municipality has a high 
share of elderly people, for example, the municipality may choose to spend the grant on elderly 
care. Finally, the natural logarithm of the total population is also included as a variable to control 
for population size effects on LSS expenditure.  
 
Merged data and missing observations 
In 2003, the municipality of Uppsala was split into two municipalities, Uppsala and Knivsta. In 
this  analysis,  these  two  municipalities  are  added  together  for  the  years  2004-2007  (values 
weighted by population). The data for the LSS service variables is available as the number of 
individuals granted each LSS service. As mentioned in section 2, the service Personal assistance is 
regulated by both the LSS-act (up to twenty hours per week) and the LASS-act (for more than 
twenty  hours  per  week).  Prior  to  2004,  many  municipalities  over-reported  the  number  of 
individuals with  Personal assistance;  they also included individuals with services granted  by the 
LASS-act (which is the responsibility of the Social Service Administration). This was clarified in 
2004, causing the reported number of individuals with Personal assistance to decrease to a more 
correct  value  (NBHW,  2005).  Due  to  the  sensitive  nature  of  the  LSS  data,  values  for 17 
 
municipalities that only have one, two, or three individuals with a particular LSS service are not 
available. Therefore, the value two is used in lieu of the non-available data. Nine municipalities
26 
have missing values for the LSS expenditure per capita variable for the year 2001. Instead, the values 
for 2002 are used. The municipalities Härjedalen and Simrishamn have missing values for LSS 
expenditure per capita for the year 2002. Here, the mean values of 2001 and 2003 are used.  
 
5. Empirical Findings 
In this section, the results for the model discussed in section 3 are presented. As previously 
mentioned, the data is divided into two separate periods, 2001-2003 and 2004-2007, in order to 
study  the  effect  of  the  temporary  and  permanent  LSS  grants.  The  determinants  of  LSS 
expenditure per capita are first estimated with Ordinary Least Square (OLS) and then with the 
Spatial Lag Model (SAR), including municipality-specific and time-specific fixed effects.
27 The 
results are presented in Table 5.  
 
The spatial lag model is theoretically consistent with spatial interaction among municipalities 
studied in this paper; even so, we must test to decide which spatial model to use: the spatial error 
model or the spatial lag model. In the search for the right sp ecification, “the classical approach” 
is used.
28 First, an OLS model is estimated. Then, a hypothesis of no spatial dependence is tested 
using a Lagrange Multiplier test (denoted LM test). Anselin et al. (1996) have developed an LM 
test to test for spatial dependence in the dependent variable or the error term for cross- sectional 
settings. Recently, Anselin et al. (2008) also specified the LM tests for spatial panels.
29 The LM 
test statistic is used to test the null hypothesis that the spatial dependence par ameter is equal to 
zero. A rejection of the null hypothesis indicates that there is spatial dependence among 
neighboring regions, due to, for example, mimicking. If the hypothesis of no spatial dependence 
                                                 
26 The nine municipalities are: Bollebygd, Finspång, Gislaved, Herrljunga, Svedala, Svenljunga, Torsby, 
Varberg, and Vindeln. 
27 In addition, three other specifications of the models were tested. One specification did not include any 
fixed effects; another specification included fixed effects for time only. However, both these specifications 
were outperformed by the specification presented in this paper. The third specification included fixed 
effects for municipalities only; since it is important to include time trends in this study, the model with 
fixed effects for both municipalities and time was chosen. The results from the above specifications can 
be obtained from the author upon request. 
28 For testing and discriminating between the spatial lag and the spatial error specification, see e.g. Anselin, 
Bera, Florax and Yoon (1996), Florax and Folmer (1992), and Florax, Folmer and Rey (2003).  
29 If significant spatial autocorrelation for both the spatial error and the spatial lag models occurs, a robust 
version of the LM test is used to select between the two models. This latter LM test is robust for non-
normality of the error terms (Anselin et al., 1996). The robust version tests if the spatial dependence is in 
the error term, controlling for spatial lag dependence, and vice versa.  18 
 
is rejected, then the LM tests are used to select between the lag and the error model. If the LM 
tests for both specifications are significant, the one with the highest test statistic is chosen (since 
the one with the higher value must be at least as good as the other).  
 
Table 5. Estimation results for 2001-2003 and 2004-2007 
  2001-2003     2004-2007 
  I - OLS  II - SAR    III - OLS  IV - SAR 
Variable  Est.  t-stat  Est.  t-stat*     Est.  t-stat  Est.  t-stat* 
Spatial Lag Coefficient      0.13  1.68        0.08  1.11 
LSS-EQ Grant, SEK            0.086  3.99  0.086  4.01 
LSS temporary Grant, SEK  0.058  0.70  0.056  0.67           
General Grant, SEK   -0.029  -1.02  -0.027  -0.94    0.021  1.11  0.021  1.17 
Tax base, SEK  -0.002  -0.30  -0.002  -0.28    -0.0002  -0.03  -0.0001  -0.08 
Population (log)  312.86  0.19  420.06  0.25    -1479.8  -1.28  -1470.5  -1.28 
Share population age 7-16  -48.08  -1.11  -47.52  -1.11    -39.76  -1.28  -41.04  -1.33 
Share population age 75+   -57.83  -1.06  -64.34  -1.2    -144.35  -3.76  -144.58  -3.79 
Individuals with LSS services 
per 10000 inhabitants  1.05  0.72  1.00  0.69    9.94  6.61  9.96  6.68 
Daily activity  -1.56  -1.06  -1.5  -1.03    -2.35  -1.54  -2.35  -1.55 
Personal Assistance  3.81  2.89  3.85  2.95    0.22  0.12  0.27  0.15 
Companion Service  4.41  2.75  4.47  2.82    2.71  1.88  2.59  1.81 
Personal Contact  -0.87  -0.62  -0.78  -0.56    -0.48  -0.39  -0.51  -0.42 
Short stay away from home  3.31  2.01  3.27  2.01    -0.49  -0.29  -0.53  -0.31 
After school supervision  3.00  1.24  2.95  1.23    2.16  0.94  2.25  0.99 
Adults in residential home  2.78  1.46  2.74  1.45     4.2  2.25  4.24  2.29 
Log-likelihood      -5611.12          -7491.51   
R-squared    0.0337          0.0737        
Number of Observations  864    864      1152    1152   
Spatial fixed effect  yes    yes      yes    yes   
Time period fixed effect  yes    yes      yes    yes   
Hausman test FE vs. RE  87.65  0.00        64.02  0.00     
LM (lag)      3.18  0.07        1.56  0.21 
Robust LM (lag)      0.10  0.75        0.77  0.38 
LM (error)      3.09  0.08        2.13  0.15 
Robust LM (error)        0.01  0.91           1.33  0.25 
*Note: for the spatial lag model, these are asymptotic t-statistics.       
 
 
As can be seen in Table 5, for the first period, the LM test statistic is significant for both the 
spatial error and the spatial lag model. Since the LM test statistic is slightly higher for the spatial 
lag model, it indicates that the spatial lag model is the appropriate model to use here. This is also 
consistent  with  both  theory  and  earlier  empirical  studies  on  spatial  interaction  among 
governments. For the second time period, however, the null hypothesis cannot be rejected, i.e. 
there is no evidence of spatial interaction among municipalities. Therefore, OLS is preferred over 
the  spatial  lag  model  for  the  years  2004 -2007.  Finally,  a  Hausman  test  is  performed  to 19 
 
discriminate between a random effects model and a fixed effects model, and the test strongly 
indicates that the fixed effects model outperforms the random effects model. Therefore, fixed 
effects for a region (municipality) and time (year) are included in the regression.  
 
Regression results 
Interestingly, the results from the regressions, shown in Table 5, support the hypothesis that 
municipalities mimic each other before the introduction of the LSS-EQ grant. In the first time 
period, there is evidence of spatial interaction among neighboring municipalities, which could be 
due to mimicking. The spatial lag coefficient of 0.13 can be interpreted as for every 100 SEK 
increase in neighbors’ spending of LSS, a municipality increases its own spending on LSS with 13 
SEK. In the second time period, in contrast, there is no longer any evidence of spatial interaction 
among neighboring municipalities. This result supports the hypothesis that the transparency of 
the  national  set  standardized  cost  level  decreases  the  interaction  (mimicking)  among 
municipalities. In fact, since the “standardized cost” for each LSS service is provided with the 
LSS-EQ grant, this may be sufficient information for the municipalities to use in order to decide 
on the LSS service/expenditure level.   
 
To study if there are differences in how the temporary LSS grant (2001-2003) and the permanent 
LSS expenditure equalization grant (2004-2007) affect LSS expenditure per capita, the data is divided 
into two different periods corresponding to each time period. The results imply that the two 
grants do not have the same effect. Specifically, during the first period, the temporary grant did 
not  affect  the  LSS  expenditure  at  all.  This  is  just  as  expected,  since  the  way  in  which  the 
temporary grant was distributed can be viewed as a way of compensating the municipalities after 
the cost has occurred. However, the interpretation of this effect could be problematic since the 
LSS grant may be endogenous here (those who received the grant are those municipalities with 
high expenditures). The permanent grant distributed during the second period, on the other 
hand, has a positive effect on the LSS expenditures. For every 100 SEK received in LSS-EQ 
grant, municipalities use 9 SEK to increase the LSS expenditures. This effect of the grant is 
consistent with the hypothesis that the grant increases local public expenditures. The result is 
plausible since the grant is known to the municipalities; they know how much they will receive 
(pay) in grant (fee) for the current year and, therefore, they can take this into account when 
setting their LSS service level.  
 
With  regard  to  the  municipality  variables  for  the  general  grant  and  tax  base,  neither  shows 
significant coefficients for either time period. An increase in either the general grant or the tax 20 
 
base does not increase the spending on LSS services. This also means that there is no evidence of 
a flypaper effect with regard to the general grant and tax base variables. Nevertheless, since the 
LSS-EQ grant has a positive effect on LSS expenditure, while the tax base does not have any 
effect, it could be regarded as a flypaper effect (money sticks where it hits). However, since only 
nine  percent  of  the  LSS-EQ  grant  go  toward  the  LSS  service,  the  flypaper  effect  is  not 
particularly strong here.
30 The flypaper effect found here is not strong compared to other studies 
either. Hines and Thaler (1995) list ten commonly cited studies that include the flypaper effect; all 
of which show some degree of flypaper effect: the flypaper effect in these studies ranges from  
0.25 to 1.00 (as compared to the 0.09 found in this study). 
 
When studying the other control variables, one major difference between the two time periods is 
that while the share of elderly people in a municipality does not have any effect on the LSS 
expenditure in the first period, it has a negative effect in the second period. This could be 
interpreted as  the LSS expenditure increasing when the share of elderly decreases in a 
municipality; which could be due to a redistribution of the budget allocation w ithin the elderly 
and disabled sector, of which both services to the elderly and the functionally impaired are part. 
The estimates for the LSS service  Personal assistance also differ greatly between the two periods. 
The reason for this is most likely that the municipalities over-reported the number of individuals 
with personal assistance during the first period, while it is corrected from 2004 and onwards. 
Another coefficient that differs greatly between the two time periods is the LSS service Adults in 
residential home. As mentioned in the data description section, this is a service that is very cost 
intensive.  While  the  coefficient  is  not  significant  in  the  first  period,  it  is  both  greater  and 
significant in the second period. The reason for this is most likely that the municipalities, from 
the year 2004, no longer use §17 agreements of cost responsibility between municipalities. The 
use of §17 agreements helped the municipalities achieve economies of scale; however, after the 
implementation of the LSS-EQ grant in 2004, the agreements are no longer in use, therefore 
both “receiving” and the “transmitting” municipalities get a higher LSS expenditure per capita. 
   
                                                 
30 When estimating a model where grants are introduced as: α*LSS grant + β*(LSS grant + General 
Grant), the α parameter is significant, while the β parameter is non-significant, indicating the presence of a 
flypaper effect.  21 
 
6. Conclusion 
In this paper, the effect of a new intergovernmental grant, introduced in 2004, with regard to the 
expenditure behavior of the municipalities, was studied. Two main questions were asked. First, 
did the grant increase the municipal expenditure for services to functionally impaired? Second, 
did the information associated with the grant (standardized cost) change the spatial interaction 
among neighboring municipalities? To answer these questions, the data was divided into two time 
periods: before and after the introduction of the LSS expenditure equalization grant. The results 
show that when municipalities received the grant in the second period, the expenditure increased 
for  the  LSS  services  by  approximately  nine  percent.  While  the  effect  of  the  LSS  grant  on 
expenditures is positive, neither the general grant nor the tax base seems to have any effect on 
the expenditures. But given that the effect of the LSS grant is greater than the no-effect of the tax 
base, it can be interpreted as evidence of the flypaper effect, i.e. expenditures are increased by 
grants.  
 
There is evidence of significant spatial interaction among the municipalities when setting their 
LSS expenditure level in the first time period. Although it is difficult to distinguish the cause of 
the spatial interaction, it is argued that in this case, the spatial interaction is due to mimicking. 
This is reasonable since the LSS service provision is relatively new to the municipalities, and the 
municipalities may not have full information on how to provide the service or what the level of 
expenditure should be. Thus, the information spillover from neighboring municipalities is used 
when setting their own expenditure level. With the introduction of the grant in 2004, the result 
shows that the spatial interaction is no longer evident, which supports the hypothesis that the 
standardized costs information provided by the grant may be viewed as a signal of what the 
actual expenditure level ought to be. This further supports the hypothesis that municipalities did 
mimic  their  neighbors  to  get  information.  Moreover,  the  lack  of  evidence  for  the  spatial 
interaction after the implementation of the LSS-EQ grant could also to some extent be due to 
the decreased use of cooperation agreements. The source of spatial interactions among local 
governments can help provide important patterns and behaviors of government reforms and 
decentralization, such as the LSS-act. 
 
Since the LSS service is regulated by an entitlement law, municipalities must grant LSS services to 
those eligible, even if it is expensive for the municipalities. Therefore, it must be noted that, on 
the margin, only 9 SEK per 100 SEK of the LSS expenditure equalization grant are used toward 
the LSS service. Since municipalities have a limited budget, increases in the expenditure – due to 22 
 
an increase in the number of individuals granted LSS service or an extension of the LSS-act – 
may instead affect other areas of the municipal service, for example, education or elderly care, i.e. 
areas where it may be easier to save.  
 
Finally, the model studied here measures the average effects on LSS expenditure of an increase in 
intergovernmental  grants  and  the  tax  base.  However,  is  likely  that  every  municipality  is  not 
affected in the same way; there is almost certainly heterogeneity among the municipalities. The 
standard deviation for the grant variables is large in most cases as well, indicating heterogeneity. 
While some municipalities would probably have been greatly affected by the grant, others would 
probably  show  a  much  smaller  effect.  Therefore,  future  studies  on  this  issue  may  find  it 
worthwhile to take this heterogeneity into account when studying the effect of the grants on the 
municipalities’ LSS expenditures.   
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Appendix A: Description of the two LSS Grants  
 
LSS temporary grant 2001 – 2003 
During 2001-2003, the government distributed an LSS grant to municipalities with extraordinarily 
high costs for their LSS service, based on the Legislative Proposal 1999/2000:115. The grant was 
functioning as “high cost protection”  (högkostnadsskydd)  for the municipalities.  The grant was 
temporary; the intention was to distribute the grant for two years only, 2001-2002, until the new 
LSS expenditure equalization grant system would be implemented. The temporary grant was later 
extended to also include 2003.   
 
LSS expenditure equalization, 2004-present 
The LSS expenditure equalization (LSS-EQ) is a national equalization system
31, completely separate 
from the ordinary General grant system for income and cost equalization. The purpose of the LSS-
EQ system is to equalize the cost for LSS among municipalities via an intra-municipality system. 
The decision to implement the LSS expenditure equalization system was based on the Legislative 
Proposal 2002/03:151. Below is a description of how the LSS equalization grant/fee is calculated.  
 
Calculation of the LSS Equalization grant/fee for the year 2004
32,33 
The  equalization  is  based  on  three  different  sources:  standardized  cost  for  LSS  services; 
differences in concentration of LSS activity; and differences in the need of care for individuals 
with LSS services.
 However, between 2004 and 2008, certain transition rules apply; therefore, the 
system  will  not  be  fully  implemented  until  the  year  2009.  The  transition  rule  consists  of  a 
maximum fee amount, as well as a maximum grant amount. For municipalities receiving the grant, the 
received grant amount will be reduced by 270, 70, 15 SEK for the years 2004, 2005 and 2006, 
respectively (per capita). Similarly, for municipalities paying the fee, the maximum fee cannot 
exceed  250, 550, 850, 1150  and 1450 SEK for  the  years 2004,  2005,  2006,  2007 and 2008, 
respectively  (per  capita).  During  the  transition  period,  the  federal  government  covers  the 
difference between the grant and the fee.  
 
                                                 
31 The LSS-EQ system is based on the Legislative Proposal “Equalization of certain costs for special 
support to persons with functional impairments” (2002/03:151) and the federal report “Equalization of 
costs for LSS” (SOU 2002:103). 
32 The information is based on Statistics Sweden’s description “Economic equalization for local government and 
equalization of municipal costs for support and service for persons with certain functional impairments” at www.scb.se 
33 The calculations for the years 2005, 2006 and 2007 are similar to this. 27 
 
A.  Calculation of Standardized-cost for LSS-services 
The calculation for standardized cost is based on the number of LSS services granted according 
to the LSS-act 1993:387 and a national average cost per type of LSS service.
34 The information on 
the number of LSS services was provided by the National Board of Health and Welfare 
(NBHW), and it was measured on September 1, 2002. The national average cost per type of LSS 
services is based on the municipalities’ annual accounts. The standardized cost is then calculated 
by multiplying the number of services with the national average cost.   
 
B.  Differences in cost due to some activity are concentrated to certain municipalities 
The  standardized-cost  from  A  is  multiplied  with  the  so-called  concentration-index.  The 
concentration-index is based on how the average-cost per LSS service is affected by the share of 
individuals with impairments in a municipality. The purpose of this calculation is to reduce the 
economies  of  scale  and  compensate  for  “small  scale  economies”.  To  minimize  the  risk  of 
“strategic planning” by the municipalities, this index is not updated yearly, nor does it have any 
fixed schedule for when it will be updated. It is the government that decides when the indexes 
should be updated.  
 
The number of individuals in a municipality that are entitled to LSS services is set in relation to 
the municipality’s population. The share for the municipality is then divided by the calculated 
share of individuals with LSS services for the whole nation. Moreover, that result is then raised to 
the power of -0.16, which will then be the municipality’s concentration-index. The value of the 
exponent explains the strength of the index. Municipalities with a higher share than the national 
average get to deduct an amount when calculating the standardized cost, and municipalities with a 
lower share than the national average must add an amount when calculating the standardized 
cost. The information about the number of individuals receiving LSS services was provided by 
the National Board of Health and Welfare and was measured on September 1, 2002.  
 
C.  Differences in cost due to differences in the need (level) of support and services  
To measure the differences in cost that are due to differences in the level of support needed, a 
personnel-cost index is used. The index measures the “level of care” for the individuals that get 
services according to the LSS-act. The calculation is based on information from a number of 
municipalities’ annual accounts for the year 2002. The index corresponds to 70 percent of the 
                                                 
34 The compensation for personal assistance according to LASS is provided by the Social Security Agency.  28 
 
difference between the municipality’s own reported personnel cost and the personnel cost that is 
the basic standardized cost as described in point A above. The reason for only compensating 70 
percent of the difference is to reduce the risk that the compensation will compensate for the 
differences in efficiency and political ambitions and not the intended level of need.  